Decision in CPLR Article 78 proceedings - DiLeonardo, Paul (2020-04-28) by unknown
Fordham Law School 
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History 
NYS Supreme Court Decisions in Article 78 
Proceedings Court Litigation Documents 
November 2021 
Decision in CPLR Article 78 proceedings - DiLeonardo, Paul 
(2020-04-28) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/pdd 
Recommended Citation 
"Decision in CPLR Article 78 proceedings - DiLeonardo, Paul (2020-04-28)" (2021). 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/pdd/355 
This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Court Litigation Documents at FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in NYS Supreme Court 
Decisions in Article 78 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of 
Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
At the term of the Supreme Court of the State 
of New York, held in and for the County of 
Dutchess, at 10 Market Street, Poughkeepsie, 
12601 on April 28, 2020. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
COUNTY OF DUTCHESS 
-----------------------------------------------------------------x 
In the Matter of 
PAUL DILEONARDO,    
    Petitioner   Index No.: 54282/2019 
 
 -against- 
         DECISION AND ORDER 
TINA M. STANFORD, Chair of the     (Motion Sequence 1) 
NEW YORK STATE PAROLE BOARD,     
      Respondent 
------------------------------------------------------------------x      
Greenwald, J. 
 
The following papers numbered 1-3 were considered by the Court in deciding Petitioner’s Notice 
of Petition/Article 78: 
             
 Papers              Numbered 
 
Notice of Petition/Petition  
by Kathy Manley, Esq. Attorney for Petitioner/ 
Exhibits A-F           1 
            
Respondent’s Answer and Return 
by Jeane L. Strickland Smith, Esq., Asst. Attorney General/ 
Exhibits 1-12           2 
 







 Petitioner files this petition pursuant to CPLR 7803, for an order vacating the Parole 
Board’s Decision, which denied his parole release on February 20, 2019 or in the alternative  an 
immediate de novo hearing before a Board composed of Commissioners who did not participate 
in the previous hearing  or in the administrative appeal.   
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 Petitioner was convicted of Murder - Second Degree and sentenced to fifteen (15) years to 
life on May 18, 2004, by the Honorable Robert J. Hanophy.  See, Petitioner’s Petition at paragraph 
2 and Petitioner’s Exhibit B; see also, Respondent’s Exhibit 2. Petitioner declares that at the 
hearing for parole release, Petitioner’s offense was discussed extensively, in light of his 
comprehensive case plan, completion of a plethora of programs, leadership and volunteer service, 
commendations from various DOCCS staff, employment offers, letters of support, low COMPAS 
risk assessment and overall remorse.  Petitioner argues that the Parole Board’s denial was based 
solely on the circumstances of the offense without consideration of any other factors, which is 
unlawful and requires a de novo hearing.  Petitioner also argues that the Board failed to give any 
detailed reasons for the denial or basis for deviating from the COMPAS assessment, which is a 
basis to vacate the Parole Board’s Determination. Petitioner administratively appealed the 
determination, and the Parole Board’s determination was affirmed by the Appeals Unit. Thus, 
Petitioner has filed this action for judicial review of the Parole Board’s determination, alleging it 
was arbitrary and capricious.  See, Petitioner’s Petition and Petitioner’s Exhibit C-F. 
 Respondent opposes the petition and argues that parole release is discretionary, and the 
Board has discretion as to the weight it gives the statutory factors considered when making a 
determination for release.  Respondent argues that the Parole Board’s decision is not based solely 
on the offense, as the Board considered all the statutory factors in its decision. Respondent 
contends that the decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the Petitioner of the reasons for the 
denial of parole, although it could have been more artfully written. Respondent declares that 
Petitioner has no constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before the expiration 
of a valid sentence thus denial of parole is not tantamount to resentencing.  Respondent argues that 
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board failed to consider the statutory factors in 
its determination, or abused the discretion vested upon it to make such determinations that would   
give a basis to annul the decision.  Thus, Petitioner’s petition should be denied.  See, Respondent’s 
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In New York, the Parole Board holds the power to decide whether to release a sentenced 
prisoner on parole. These decisions are within the Board’s discretion, and such discretion is 
structured by the Board’s use of guidelines.  When the Parole Board’s decisions are made in 
accordance with statutory requirements, the decisions are not subject to judicial review.  However, 
the judicial review of parole board determinations is narrowly circumscribed and may only be set 
aside where it evinces irrationality bordering on impropriety. See, Ferrante v Stanford, 172 A.D. 
3d 31, 37 (2nd Dept. 2019); see also, Matter of Ganci v Hammock, 99 A.D.2d 546, 547 (2nd Dept. 
1984). 
 Pursuant to Executive Law §259-i, discretionary release on parole shall not be granted 
merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after 
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare 
of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law.  
The Board must consider the eight factors identified in the statute when making its determination. 
See, Executive Law §259-i (2) (c) (A). 
Although it is well settled that qualified risk and needs assessments are instruments utilized 
in making parole determinations, these instruments do not supercede the independent discretionary 
authority of the Parole Board.  Thus, while the Parole Board is required to consider the COMPAS 
instrument when exercising its discretionary authority to determine whether or not petitioners 
should be released from DOCCS custody it is not bound by the quantified results of the COMPAS 
assessment and is free to grant or deny parole based upon its independent assessment of the factors 
set forth in Executive Law §259–i(2)(c)(A) including, the nature of the crimes underlying 
Petitioner’s incarceration. It is well settled that the Parole Board may not deny an inmate parole 
based solely on the seriousness of the offense.  Nonetheless, the weight accorded to any particular 
factor is solely within a Parole Board's discretion.  See, In re Williams, 49 Misc. 3d 732, 743 
(Franklin County Sup. Ct. 2015) and Matter of Rabenbauer v New York State Dept. of Corrections 
and Community Supervision, 46 Misc. 3d 603, 606 (Sullivan County Sup. Ct 2014); see also, 
Ferrante v Stanford, 172 A.D. 3d 31, 37 (2nd Dept. 2019). 
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Although the Parole Board need not expressly discuss each of these factors in 
its determination, it is required to inform the inmate in writing of the factors and reasons for 
the denial of parole, and such reasons shall be given in detail and not in conclusory terms. 
However, it is the Petitioner’s burden to demonstrate that the Parole Board failed to consider the 
statutory factors set forth in Executive Law §259–i, and the denial was based solely on the 
seriousness of his crime; moreover, that the Parole Board's determination otherwise evinced 
irrationality bordering on impropriety.  See, Matter of Goldberg v New York State Bd. of Parole, 
103 A.D. 3d 634, 635 (2nd Dept. 2013); see also, Matter of Malone v Evans, 83 A.D. 3d 719 (2nd 
Dept. 2011). 
 Here, the Parole Board appears to have considered the relevant factors and conclude that 
there is more work for Petitioner to do regarding Petitioner’s anger issue, the issue deemed to be  
a significant factor in the underlying offense, and as such it would be inappropriate to release 
Petitioner, as to do so would deprecate the serious nature of the crime and undermine respect for 
the law.  See, Petitioner’s Exhibit A. 
 There is a rational basis for the Parole Board’s decision. While it is understandable that 
Petitioner desires a more in-depth analysis of how the Board made its determination, this Court 
cannot deem that it is statutorily required. The determination is written in the simplest form, but it 
is not in conclusory terms. The decision demonstrates consideration of the Petitioner’s 
adjustments, accomplishments, commendations, COMPAS risk assessment, as well as the 
opposition to the Petitioner’s release and the seriousness of the offense. The weight given to each 
factor lies within the discretion of the Parole Board and the Board is not required to weigh the 
factors equally or by any prescribed formula.  
An Article 78 reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for the judgment of an 
administrative agency whose actions it is reviewing unless the agency's decision 
is arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals held that arbitrary action is without sound basis 
in reason and is generally taken without regard to the facts. Moreover, once it has been determined 
that an agency's conclusion has a sound basis in reason the judicial function is at an end. See, 
Matter of D.S. v Hogan, 22 Misc. 3d 527, 537 (New York County Sup. Ct. 2008). To that extent, 
and based upon the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the Parole Board’s determination to 
deny Petitioner parole release was not arbitrary and capricious, thus Petitioner’s petition is denied. 
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 Accordingly, it is hereby, 
   
 ORDERED, that Petitioner’s Article 78 Petition, seeking vacatur of the Parole Board’s 
decision or in the alternative an immediate de novo hearing is denied. 
  
Any relief not specifically granted herein is denied. 
The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of this Court. 
 
Dated: April 28, 2020 
 Poughkeepsie, New York 
 




        ______________________________ 
        Hon. Hal B. Greenwald, J.S.C.   
 
 
CPLR Section 5513, an appeal as of right must be taken within thirty days after service by a party 
upon the appellant of a copy of the judgment or order appealed from and written notice of its entry, 
except that when the appellant has served a copy of the judgment or order and written notice of its 
entry, the appeal must be taken within thirty days thereof. 
 
When submitting motion papers to the Honorable Hal B. Greenwald’s Chambers, please do 
not submit any copies.  Please submit only the original papers. 
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